Trade policy has once again become one of the main sources of uncertainty for the global economy. The return of tariffs as an instrument of geopolitical pressure — first against China, then extended to Europe, Canada, Mexico and other partners — has revived a debate that seemed settled for decades: whether multilateral free trade is still the norm or whether we are entering an era of structural trade fragmentation.
For industrial, export-oriented or internationally supply-chained companies, this is not just political noise. It is an operational and strategic variable that is affecting costs, timelines, contracts, margins and long-term planning. And, unlike previous episodes, the growing sense is that this is not a temporary disruption but a regime change that demands deeper responses.
The return of tariffs as a geopolitical instrument
The Trump administration relaunched a broad-spectrum tariff policy in 2025: 25% tariffs on imports from Canada and Mexico, 145% on a large portion of Chinese imports, and a universal 10% tariff on all imports. Europe was not spared: tariffs on European steel and aluminium were reinstated, and the threat of additional sectoral tariffs on automotive, pharmaceutical and technology products continued to loom over the transatlantic relationship.
The IMF has estimated that the cumulative impact of these measures on global growth could reduce world GDP by around 0.5–1 percentage points over the 2025–2026 horizon. For very open and export-oriented economies, the effect may be notably greater.
IMF World Economic Outlook – April 2026
From the US-China trade war to systemic fragmentation
What started as a bilateral dispute between the United States and China has been mutating into something more complex: a progressive reconfiguration of global trade around blocs of greater political affinity and lesser mutual dependence. The WTO has long been warning of the risk of bifurcation: its simulations suggest that a deep fragmentation of the trading system could reduce global GDP in the long run by between 2% and 7%, with asymmetric effects. Countries in the middle- and lower-income brackets, which depend more on access to external markets and imported technology, stand to lose the most.
WTO – Global Trade Report 2025
For companies operating in global value chains, this translates into growing pressure to choose: which suppliers to work with, from which geographies to operate, under which regulatory relationships to grow. Strategic neutrality, which until recently was a reasonable option, is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain.
Europe: between negotiation and defence of the internal market
The European Union has responded to the new scenario with a combination of diplomatic negotiation and reinforcement of its trade defence instruments. The anti-subsidy instrument applied to Chinese electric vehicles, and the coordinated responses to steel and aluminium tariffs, mark a shift towards a more active Europe in defence of its industrial base.
But the European position is not without internal tensions. The interests of Germany, France, the Nordic countries and Eastern members are not identical in the face of a transatlantic tariff escalation. And the room for manoeuvre is limited when the world’s largest market uses access to its demand as a lever of strategic pressure.
European Commission – Trade Defence and Policy Instruments
The real effect on supply chains
Beyond the macroeconomic figures, the most immediate consequence for many companies lies in logistics and supply chains. Tariffs are not just an added cost; they force a rethinking of where to buy, where to manufacture and how to structure the supplier network.
Trends that were already visible have accelerated:
1. Nearshoring and friendshoring
Many companies are relocating part of their production or procurement to geographies closer to or more politically aligned with their destination markets.
2. Inventory duplication
Tariff uncertainty pushes some companies to maintain higher safety stocks, with the resulting financial and operational cost.
3. Contract and supplier relationship review
Deadlines, penalties and delivery conditions become more sensitive when rules of origin and cost overruns can change by decree.
4. Product redesign
In some sectors, tariff pressure is leading companies to reconsider product composition to minimise the percentage of components subject to restrictive measures.
What this means for investment
From an investment perspective, trade fragmentation is not only a risk: it also creates opportunities for those who know how to read it. The clearest winners are companies and geographies that act as corridors between blocs, as alternative suppliers in chains being rediversified, or as beneficiaries of the logistics, industrial and supply infrastructure investment generated by rebalancing.
The OECD has noted that trade policy uncertainty reduces private investment more sharply than the actual level of tariffs. When companies do not know what rules will be in force in twelve months, they tend to postpone decisions.
OECD Economic Outlook – May 2026
This makes the capacity to analyse the geopolitical and regulatory environment a competitive advantage in its own right. Organisations that incorporate trade policy monitoring as a strategic — not merely reactive — variable will be better positioned to identify windows, anticipate changes and adjust their procurement, production and investment decisions.
The long run: irreversible fragmentation?
The honest answer is that we do not yet know with certainty whether we are facing a temporary rebalancing or a structural paradigm shift in international trade. But the signals suggest that, even if tensions ease at some point, the logic of greater national control over critical chains, greater geographical diversification of suppliers and greater integration of economic security into trade policy is here to stay.
In that new scenario, geopolitical analysis is not a luxury reserved for large corporations. It is a basic capability for any company with significant exposure to international trade.